We use a universal, extensive form interactive beliefs system to provide an epistemic characterization of a weak and a strong notion of rationalizability with independent beliefs. The weak solution concept is equivalent to backward induction in generic perfect information games where no player moves more than once in any play. The strong solution concept is related to explicability (Reny, 1992) and is outcome equivalent to backward induction in generic games of perfect information.
Introduction
Extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce, 1984; Battigalli, , 1997 attempts to capture the implications of rationality and common certainty of rationality in extensive games. It incorporates a powerful, yet quite natural notion of forward induction, known as the best rationalization principle: the idea that, when faced with unexpected events, players attempt to explain (''rationalize'') what has transpired in a manner which is consistent with the highest possible degree of strategic sophistication of their opponents. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997) formalize the best rationalization principle in the framework of the extensive-form epistemic model developed in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1998) , and show that, together with the assumption that players choose (weakly) sequentially rational strategies, it completely characterizes extensiveform rationalizability.
In their setup, a player's beliefs about her opponents's strategies and epistemic types are represented by conditional probability systems (see Rênyi, 1956; myerson, 1986) . For games with more than two players, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997) allow conditional beliefs about the opponents to exhibit correlation. Consequently, the solution concept they characterize is more accurately referred to as ''correlated extensive-form rationalizability''. This paper focuses on the interplay between independence and rationalizability in extensive games. First, we propose a notion of epistemic independence, and show that (i) rationality, (ii) epistemic independence and (iii) common certainty of rationality and epistemic independence at the beginning of the game, completely characterize weak rationalizability, a refinement of a solution concept studied by Ben-Porath (1997) . † Second, we formalize a notion of independent best rationalization and show that, along with epistemic independence and rationality, it completely characterizes strong rationalizability, a solution concept first proposed by . Interestingly enough, the algorithmic definition of strong rationalizability was motivated by examples in which Pearce's original procedure failed to capture certain ''intuitive'' implications of the independence assumption. Strong rationalizability is also related to Reny's explicability (see Reny, 1992) .
Our notion of epistemic independence, which we adapt from , formalizes the idea that players should only revise their beliefs about a particular opponent when they receive information about him or her. Care must be taken in defining the relevant product structure on the state space: Subsection 4.1 discusses the details and the relationship with other notions of independence.
In order to obtain a sound notion of extensive form rationalizability with independent beliefs, epistemic independence has to be combined with a modified version of the best rationalization principle. In fact, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997) characterize a ''collective'' version of this principle which requires a player's revised beliefs to be consistent with the highest degree of strategic sophistication which can be jointly attributed to all opponents. It only prescribes a common lower bound on strategic sophistication; if an unexpected occurrence proves that some opponents are characterized by only ''average'' strategic sophistication, but does not falsify the assumption that the remaining opponents are ''highly'' sophisticated, the observer is assumed to attribute at least an † Ben Porath (1997) allows for correlated beliefs.
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''average'' degree of sophistication to all opponents (as opposed to e.g. ''low'' sophistication), but is not required to differentiate among the two groups. In particular, ''hard'' information concerning the first group of opponents only may be taken to signal that the remaining players, too, are only endowed with ''average'' strategic sophistication.
But if players' beliefs about their opponents satisfy the epistemic independence property, it is more natural to assume that, when they rationalize observed behavior, players process information about each one of their opponents separately. Thus, independent best rationalization naturally complements epistemic independence.
The axioms we propose may be informally stated as follows. As in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997) , for any event E, we say that a player strongly believes that E if she is certain that E is true conditional on any information set which is not inconsistent with E. . . . We remark that our formal notion of ''strong belief'' is slightly different from the one appearing in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997) , although the basic intuition is the same. Also, our axioms are necessarily ''richer'' than those proposed in the a forementioned paper. Consequently, our epistemic model (developed in Section 3) must also be richer; specifically, we must allow players to form conjectures conditional on a wider class of hypotheses.
Analogously to Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997) , our results may also be related to backward induction. For generic perfect information games in which each player never moves twice in any realization path, weak rationalizability selects the (unique) backward induction strategy profile. Similarly, for arbitrary games with perfect information and generic payoffs, strong rationalizability is outcome-equivalent to backward induction. † Therefore, our characterization results provide alternative sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome. † This does not follow from results in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997) , because, strictly speaking, strong rationalizability is not ''stronger'' than correlated rationalizability-only ''different. '' See Battigalli (1996) for additional discussion. This paper builds on Siniscalchi (1997, 1998) . Our extensive form epistemic model can be regarded as a generalization of the model used by Ben Porath (1997) to characterize common certainty of rationality at the beginning of a perfect information game. Stalnaker (1996a,b) considers a related normal form model, which can also be used to analyze extensive form reasoning. Unlike our epistemic model, those of Ben Porath and Stalnaker are not universal (for more on this comparison see Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1997 , 1998 ). Stalnaker, (1996b puts forward a notion of ''robust belief'' which corresponds to ''strong belief'' as defined in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997) and briefly discusses the relation between robust belief in rationality and forward induction. Also, he proposes a notion of ''epistemic independence'' which is closely related to the one developed in . Aumann (1995 , 1998 and Samet (1996 use different epistemic models and provide a different set of sufficient conditions for the backward induction outcome. Their results involving the notion of common knowledge rather than common certainty, (see Fagin et al., 1995; Dekel & gul, 1997) do not deal with strategic independence, and do not contain explicit assumptions concerning how players update their beliefs when they face unexpected evidence (although Samet comes somewhat closer to this with his notion of ''hypothetical knowledge''). Finally, in the context of a partitional model, Asheim and Dufwemberg (1996) formalize the notion of ''common certainty of admissibility'' and thereby characterize an iterated deletion procedure which captures certain aspects of forward induction. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses two examples which motivate our axiom systems and the solution concepts they characterize. Section 3 introduces the epistemic model. Weak and strong rationalizability, as well as the axioms which characterize them, are defined in Section 4, which contains the main results. Comments on explicability and results concerning backward induction are collected in Section 5. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Motivating examples
As was anticipated in the introduction, the assumption that players choose their strategies independently suggests two related but distinct assumptions for extensive-game analysis.
The first pertains to players' beliefs in the course of the game. Quite naturally, in light of the assumption of causal independence between the strategies of different players, it seems interesting to explore the further assumption that players' conjectures exhibit some form of epistemic (or stochastic) independence. We would like to consider a restriction that in games of perfect information (like the examples below) has the following flavor: a player will not revise her beliefs about an opponent until she observes an action taken by that particular opponent. Observations about other opponents' choices should be irrelevant. † Subsection 4.1 introduces the formal and general notion of (epistemic) independence we adopt in this paper; the following example illustrates the basic intuition. Notice that ''D'' is strictly dominant for player 1; also, ''d'' is conditionally strictly dominant for player 3. Hence, if player 2 is certain (at the beginning of the game) that 1 and 3 are sequentially rational, he should expect them to choose ''D'' and ''d'', respectively. But what if player 2's node is actually reached? Player 2 cannot continue to believe that player 1 is rational: he has just received evidence to the contrary. If player 2 entertains the hypothesis that players 1 and 3 might be coordinating their strategies (e.g. if he believes that player 3 is really an ''agent'' of player 1) then he might be justified in expecting player 3 to choose ''a'' at the last node. Hence, in the absence of any independence assumption, we can justify player 2's choice of ''t''. Correlated EFR captures precisely this type of reasoning.
Once we require that players' beliefs be stochastically independent, predictions are narrowed down to a single strategy profile: player 2, upon observing 1's choice of ''A'', is not allowed to revise his initial beliefs about player 3. Thus, expecting ''d'' at the last node, he does well to choose ''b''.
Notice that, in order to reach this conclusion, we only need to assume that players are sequentially rational, have independent conjectures and are certain that this is the case at the beginning of the game: this is of course the type of restrictions characterizing weak rationalizability.
A slightly more complicated example illustrates the interaction between epistemic independence and the best rationalization principle. It will be convenient to briefly describe the axioms proposed by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997) We may also consider a solution concept which is somehow halfway between extensive-form rationalizability and strong rationalizability; for this hybrid concept, (0I) D 0S D ''Every player is (weakly) sequentially rational and has epistemically independent beliefs'' and, for k > 0, (kI) is defined analogously to (k). † Finally, weak rationalizability is characterized by the axioms (0W) D (0S), and for k > 0, kW D ''Everybody is certain that ( k 1 W) at the beginning of the game''.
Let us now proceed with the analysis of the game. Observe first that player 1, if rational, will never play ''C''; similarly, choosing ''d 0 '' is conditionally strictly dominated for player 2, and player 3 would choose ''D 00 '' after ''A 0 ''. Any remaining strategy of players 2 and 3 may be justified by some independent system of conditional beliefs over the strategy profiles of the respective opponents.
Hence, axioms (0) and (0W) D (0I) D (0S) identify the same set of strategy profiles. It is easy to see that, if we add axiom (1) to axiom (0), we do not obtain any further restrictions: as soon as player 2's first node is reached, the assumption that every player is rational is clearly falsified, so players 2 and 3 may update their beliefs arbitrarily. Hence, any rational strategy for these players survives the second (and therefore any successive) round of inductive reasoning.
Let us consider adding axiom (1W) to (0W) D (0I) D (0S). Player 2 assigns probability zero to player 3's irrational strategy ''A 0 A 00 '' at the beginning of the game and epistemic independence implies that he continues to do so at his first node. However, the axioms do not pin down the conditional probability assigned by player 2 to ''A 0 A 00 '' at his second node. Specifically, suppose that player 2 initially was certain that player 3 would choose ''D 0 ''. Upon reaching his second node, player 2 must conclude that his initial conjecture was wrong, and is therefore forced to form new beliefs. This clearly does not violate stochastic independence, as new information on player 3 has indeed been obtained. Moreover, since we are imposing rationality restrictions only on ex-ante beliefs, player 2's beliefs at his second node may be arbitrarily specified-which again allows one to justify any one of his rational strategies. It is easy to see that all of player 3's rational strategies may still be justified; hence, axiom (1W), too, imposes no further restrictions: weak and correlated rationalizability yield the same solution in this example. † Recall that Axioms (kS) (k D 0, 1, . . .) are stated in the introduction.
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Next, consider adding axiom (1I) instead of (1W). Again, player 2 assigns probability zero to ''A 0 A 00 '' at his first node. But the key observation is that, even under this stronger axiom, player 2's updated beliefs at his second node are still unrestricted.
Again, suppose that his initial conjecture assigned marginal probability 1 to player 3's strategy ''D 0 ''. This assumption is falsified at player 2's second node, so stochastic independence has no bite. Axiom (1I) requires player 2 to ''strongly believe''-believe whenever possible -that every player is rational and has independent beliefs. While it is possible for player 2 to continue to believe that player 3 is rational (and has independent beliefs), he now is certain that player 1 is not rational. But this means that it is not possible for player 2 to believe that everybody is rational (and has independent beliefs), so in fact axiom (1I) has no bite. Thus, the three sets of axioms considered above induce the same solution in this game.
The example illustrates that we need to complement the epistemic independence assumption with an additional restriction on belief revision. The intuitive notion we would like to capture is the following: each player separately assesses the degree of strategic sophistication of every one of her opponents. By contrast, correlated rationalizability reflects the assumption that players assess the joint degree of strategic sophistication of their opponents, viewed as a group; more specifically, players attribute to each one of their opponents (at least) the degree of strategic sophistication of the ''least sophisticated'' among them.
In the current example, axiom (1S.2) restricts player 2's beliefs at his second node: he must necessarily expect player 3 to follow ''A 0 '' with ''D 00 '', because ''A 0 A 00 '' is her only strategy which reaches player 2's second node and is consistent with axiom (0S.3). This is true even if axiom (0S.1) clearly cannot hold if the node under consideration is reached.
It is now easy to see that axiom (2S.3) implies that player 3 will anticipate this, and hence choose ''D 0 '' at her first node. Strong rationalizability thus yields more stringent restrictions than the other solution concepts considered here (although, in this particular example, it selects the same outcome).
Game-theoretic setup and epistemic model
EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
For simplicity we consider finite extensive games with complete (but possibly imperfect) information, perfect recall and no chance moves. We use the following notation: Our notation is consistent with the possibility that some moves are simultaneous and that some information sets may be owned by several players, a possibility which is allowed by some extensive form representations of dynamic games (e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Ch. 6 ). For example, in multi-stage games with observable actions we would have H i D H for all players i, where H is the set of partial histories of action profiles. In this particular case each h 2 H represents a common observation by all the players. †
EPISTEMIC MODEL
Conditional probability systems
Consider a collection of Polish (complete, separable, metrizable) spaces fY 1 , . . . , Y n g. We interpret y i 2 Y i as an unobservable (and payoff irrelevant) parameter representing the conditional beliefs of player i. The Cartesian product n iD1 S i ð Y i is also Polish (we endow each S i with the discrete topology and n iD1 S i ð Y i with the product topology). Let S D 2 S nf;g denote the collection of all the non-empty subsets of S. Fix a non-empty collection B Â S of ''relevant hypotheses'' about s 2 S. Then we obtain a corresponding collection, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1998) 
The set of probability measures on a measure space Z, A is denoted by  Z ; the set of conditional probability systems on 
Universal type space
For any measurable product space X ð Y and any probability measure m 2  X ð Y let mrg X m 2  X denote the marginal of m on X. A universal type space on S i , B i i2N is given by a tuple T i , g i i2N whereby, for every player i 2 N, T i is a Polish space, the function
and the corresponding function g i defined by
Universal type spaces of this sort are explicitly constructed and analyzed by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1998) to which we refer for details. † An element t i 2 T i represents a possible epistemic type for player i. The equation above is an introspection property essentially saying that a player knows his own type.
Note that, in general, distinct players may have different collections of relevant hypotheses. In fact, the most natural collection for player i is the one representing his information sets:
However, in this paper we will assume that players regard any non-empty subset of S (that is, any event regarding the players' dispositions to act, but not their epistemic states) as a relevant conditioning hypothesis: that is, we take 
Similarly, using the maps j 1 j and j
we can derive the third † Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1998) consider symmetric type spaces for two-person dynamic games and do not explicitly represent a player's conditional beliefs about his own conditional beliefs, but the appropriate modifications to their analysis to fit the present framework are straightforward.
† Even in this ''almost symmetric'' case, the sets of types and belief functions of distinct players are formally different, because they satisfy different introspection properties. order CPS j 3 t i implicit in type t i : for each measurable set
and relevant hypothesis B 2 B i , 
Since this holds for every type of every player, every type of every player is certain conditional on every relevant hypothesis that everybody's type satisfies the coherency condition, every type of every player is certain, conditional on every relevant hypothesis, of the latter fact and so on. The same holds for the introspection property relative to beliefs of any order.
We call the type space T i , g i i2N universal because it can be shown that, since each associated function g i is a homeomorphism, each T i ''contains'' every infinite hierarchy of CPSs satisfying conditional common certainty of coherency and introspection. This means that focusing on such a type space we are not implicitly introducing extraneous assumptions about players' conditional beliefs of any order. As argued in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997) , this is crucial if we are to provide a transparent epistemic characterization of extensive form solution concepts involving some form of forward induction.
Epistemic independence and rationalizability
In this section we define and characterize a weak and a strong notion of extensive form rationalizability with independent beliefs. The weak notion of rationalizability is a refinement of a solution concept proposed by Ben Porath (1997) to characterize common certainty of rationality in extensive form games. The strong notion of rationalizability has been put forward by to amend a flaw in Pearce's notion of extensive form rationalizability (see Pearce, 1994) and is related to an iterative deletion procedure proposed by Reny (1992) to define explicable equilibrium, a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. The relationship between each of these solution concepts and backward induction is noted below. The notion of independence used here is related to, but weaker than Kreps and Wilson's (1982) consistency of assessments and has been given a decision theoretic axiomatization by Battigalli and Veronesi (1996) . The phrase ''epistemic independence'' is borrowed from Stalnaker (1996b) who uses it to indicate a very similar property.
Recall that we assume here that, for each player i, the collection of relevant hypotheses coincides with the whole set of non-empty subsets of S, or-in our notation-B i D S for all i 2 N. This simplifies our notation and allows a transparent definition of the independence property for general games. † To make our formulation simpler, the following notation will be convenient. A first order CPS for an arbitrary player i is typically denoted by 
It is easily checked that
An analogous definition holds for first order conditional systems d 2  S S . Let I S n jD1 S j ð T j and I S S be the sets of CPSs (on n jD1 S j ð T j , S and S, S respectively) satisfying the epistemic independence condition. For brevity, we simply call such conditional systems independent.
REMARK 2: For all i 2 N, t i 2 T i , if g i t i is independent, then d i t i (the first order CPS of t i ) is also independent.
We show in the Appendix (see Lemma 6.2) that a sort of ''converse'' is also true: if a given first order CPS d i is independent, then there exists an independent type t i such that
WEAK AND STRONG RATIONALIZABILITY WITH INDEPENDENT
BELIEFS
The basic building block of the following solution concepts is the notion of weak sequential rationality. This is a best response property which applies to plans of actions † as well as strategies (see e.g. Reny, 1992) . We adopt the specific formalization proposed in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1998) 
S). A strategy s i 2 S i is a weakly sequential best reply to υ i if, for every h 2 H i (s i ) and every s
We refer the interested reader to Battigalli & Siniscalchi (1998) for details on the features of this definition. Here we simply point out that part 1 essentially means that a rational player is certain † Intuitively, a plan of action for player i is silent about which actions would be taken by i if i did not follow that plan. Formally, a plan of action is a class of realization-equivalent strategies. In generic extensive games, a plan of action is a strategy of the reduced normal form.
of her strategy (hence of her future contingent choices) as long as she knows that she has not deviated from it. We are now ready to define the weak and strong rationalizability procedure. . shows that the set of strongly rationalizable strategies is non-empty. The following shows that our terminology is consistent and implies that the set of weakly rationalizable strategies is also non-empty. In our epistemic model, the set of states of the world is the product space
However, we will often be interested in events which concern a given player j exclusively. In keeping with our notation, E j denotes the Borel s-algebra on S j ð T j . For any E 2 E j , let
We shall say that E corresponds to the event [E] j , which concerns player j only.
Thus the subsets
respectively correspond to the events ''player j is rational'' and ''player j has independent beliefs.'' R D n iD1 R i and I D n iD1 I i are the events ''everyone is rational'' and ''everyone has independent beliefs.'' †
Weak rationalizability
We say that an epistemic type t j is certain of event E if the prior belief of t i assigns probability 1 to E, that is, g j,S t j E D 1. Let
be the subset corresponding to the event ''player j is certain of
is the event ''everybody is certain of E.'' b has all the standard properties of a common belief operator ‡, but of course it does † Observe that these events could also be written as R D i2N [R i 
not satisfy the truth axiom: b E Â E does not necessarily hold. Iterations of b are defined in the usual way and denote mutual certainty of degree k.
Thus, the event ''it is the case that E and there is common certainty of E'' is 
Strong rationalizability
We now move on to strong rationalizability. The following definition introduces the first key ingredient in our axiomatization. We formalize the idea that a player i may formulate a conjecture about a particular opponent j, and for every hypothesis concerning j only and consistent with such conjecture she may be unwilling to revise it.
Recall that S j D 2 S j n f;g, which we view as the counterpart to E j in S j . DEFINITION 4: For any pair of players i, j 2 N, type t i 2 T i and measurable subset E j Â S j ð T j , we say that type t i strongly believes E j if for all B j 2 S j ,
The second ingredient in our axiomatization is the independent best rationalization principle. The idea (which will be made explicit in Remark 3 below) is that, at each point in the game, players bestow the highest possible degree of strategic sophistication upon each one of their opponents independently. That is, for all i and j (j 6 D i), player i strongly believes that j is rational, and for all i, j and k (j 6 D i, k 6 D j), i strongly believes that j strongly believes that k is rational, etc.
We formalize the best rationalization principle as follows. Given any collection E j j2N 2 E 1 ð E 2 ð . . . ð E n , for every i 2 N, let
] 2 E i for every i 2 N (so the above definition is indeed meaningful). Also, the sets g l i . form a monotonically decreasing sequence.
The following remark further clarifies the nature of our assumptions. It also justifies the informal statement of the axioms given in the Introduction.
REMARK 3: For every l ½ 0 and i 2 N,
We can finally state the characterization result: 
Relationship with other solution concepts
EXPLICABILITY
As we have mentioned above, strong rationalizability and explicability (Reny, 1992) are similarly motivated and formally comparable. This is apparent if one compares our definition 3 with the iterative procedure defined by Reny (1992, p. 639 ).
Analogously to strong rationalizability, Reny's procedure identifies a partition of each player's strategy space whose elements are ordered according to their degree of strategic sophistication (or ''explicability''). A set of ''beliefs'' (see below) is associated with each element of the partition; beliefs associated with the set of ''k-th order explicable'' strategies satisfy a restriction analogous to condition 2 in definition 3. Finally, strategies are k C 1-th order explicable if they are weakly sequential best replies relative to beliefs consistent with k-th order explicability.
However, explicability and strong rationalizability are not equivalent.
First, Reny models beliefs by means of consistent assessments, as in Kreps and Wilson (1982) . As is well known, this entails a strong notion of independence-stronger than our epistemic independence condition. However, for games with observable deviators this difference disappears (see e.g. and references therein).
The second difference is more subtle, but substantive and not easily circumvented. Given a family of behavioral strategy profiles, Reny deems a strategy a best reply relative to that family if it can be rationalized by any element in the convex hull of that set.
Our setup cannot accommodate such an assumption in a natural way. Indeed, we are suspicious about its legitimacy. † Note that Selten (1975) explicitly avoids taking pointwise convex combinations of behavioral strategies by defining a notion of behavioral strategy mixtures, whereby different behavioral strategies may be selected before the game begins according to a random mechanism and conditional probabilities of actions are then derived via Bayes rule. For example, move probabilities at information sets which can be reached by only one of the behavioral strategies, among which the mechanism choises are determined by that strategy only. It should be clear that defining beliefs as CPS's on the set of pure strategy profiles, as we do, allows for behavioral strategy mixtures.
BACKWARD INDUCTION
We now turn to the relationship between each of the solution concepts characterized in the previous section and backward † Suppose that in a two-person, two-stage game player 1 has only two rational (pure) plans of action: L followed by L or R followed by R. Clearly, if player 2 strongly believes that player 1 is rational, he should expect in the second stage the same action observed in the first. But taking pointwise convex combinations of rational behavioral strategies, one typically obtains non-degenerate expectations in the second stage.
induction. In particularly simple games, weak rationalizability is sufficient to yield the backward induction solution: (Reny, 1992) Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997) , section 4.2.
Appendix
The following preliminary result is required in the proofs of propositions 1 and 3; it may also be of independent interest. , as required.
The next ancillary result extends Lemma 5.1 in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1997 Therefore m i is independent.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION: (a) We proceed by induction on k. At each
